We use the framework of random matching games and develop a two society model to analyze the interaction of societies with different social norms. Each agent repeatedly faces two different coordination games. A social norm of a society is a mode of behavior - strategy - which is adopted by a majority of agents in the society. There are many equilibria in thsi world.
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Paper provided by Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research in its series Papers with number
450.
Length: 29 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:osakae:450
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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