We buid a simple model of commuter railways where congestion exists, show that price-cap (PC) regulation causes congestion compared to rate-of-return (ROR) regulation. We next consider methods to correct it, and show the following results: (i) PC regulation, in which the cap is made contingent on congestion, can correct the congestion without distorting cost-reducing efforts, (ii) PC regulation, in which the cap depends on investment in transportation capacity, can also correct the congestion but distorts cost-reducing efforts. We demonstrate these results by simulation, based on data from the Tokyu To-Yoko line in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research in its series Papers with number
449.
Length: 50 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:osakae:449
Contact details of provider: Postal: OSAKA UNIVERSITY, THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH(I.S .E.R.), 6-1 MIHOGAOKA IBARAKI OSAKA 567 JAPAN Fax: 81-6-6878-2766 Email: Web page: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).