Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegociation

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Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegociation

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Sjostrom, T.

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Tomas Sjostrom

Abstract

This paper looks at implementation in economic environments when agents have perfect information about the state of the world, but cannot commit not to renegotiate bad outcomes or to collude against each other. If renegotiation satisfies a weak condition of disagreement point monotonicity, then any Pareto-efficient social choice function can be implemented if there are at least three agents who play undominated Nash equilibria. The mechanism does not use modulo or integer games, has no bad mixed strategy equilibria and is "bounded".

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Paper provided by Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research in its series Papers with number 448.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:osakae:448

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Related research
Keywords: GAMES ; SOCIAL CHOICE;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Sjostrom, Tomas, 1999. "Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 337-352, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Tomas Sjostrom, 1997. "Undominated Nash Implementaion with Collusion and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1791, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

Cited by:
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Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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