Groves-Ledyard (1977) constructed a mechanism attaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of public goods. After this path-breaking paper, many mechanisms have been proposed to attain desirable allocations with public goods. Thus, economists have thought that the free-rider problem is solved, in theory. Our view to this problem is not so optimistic. Rather, we propose fundamental impossibility theorems with public goods. In the previous mechanism design, it was implicitly assumed that every agent must participate in the mechanism that the designer provides.
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Paper provided by Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research in its series Papers with number
445.
Length: 32 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:osakae:445
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