This paper looks at the relationship between centralisation of the wage bargain and individual effort when the effort elicitation mechanism is provided by intra-firm, rather tha inter firm, wage differentials.
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Paper provided by Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research in its series Papers with number
426.
Length: 27 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:osakae:426
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Find related papers by JEL classification: J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory