The paper examines the conventional wisdom that large buyers pay lower prices to suppliers than do small buyers. In the model, a supplier separately bargains with n buyers. The buyer's size is endogenous since they can merge prior to negotiations with the supplier.
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Paper provided by Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research in its series Papers with number
424.
Length: 37 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:osakae:424
Contact details of provider: Postal: OSAKA UNIVERSITY, THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH(I.S .E.R.), 6-1 MIHOGAOKA IBARAKI OSAKA 567 JAPAN Fax: 81-6-6878-2766 Email: Web page: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/ More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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