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Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production

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Author Info
Itoh, H.

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine how tasks should be allocated in a simple hierarchy consisting of an organizational designer and subordinates, in the framework of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research in its series Papers with number 403.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:osakae:403

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Postal: OSAKA UNIVERSITY, THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH(I.S .E.R.), 6-1 MIHOGAOKA IBARAKI OSAKA 567 JAPAN
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Web page: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/
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Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION; HUMAN RESOURCES; MANPOWER; MANPOWER; MORAL HAZARD;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executive Compensation

Cited by:
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  1. Oliver Gürtler, 2005. "On Delegation under Relational Contracts," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse32_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "On Delegation under Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 113, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2009. "Task assignment, incentives and technological factors," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 43-55. [Downloadable!]
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