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Contingent Control Rights and Managerial Incentives: The Design of Long-term Debt

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  • Zsuzsanna Fluck
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    Abstract

    Enterprises, small or large, rely heavily on long-term financing arrangements to fund their operations. However, it has proved difficult for financial theory to justify the use of long-term contracts when the manager has the ability to divert or manipulate the cash flows, and when it is prohibitively costly for a third party, such as a court, to verify or prove any managerial wrongdoing. Why would investors enter into financial contracts that extend beyond the life of the firm's existing physical assets when such

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business- in its series New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires with number 99-070.

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    Date of creation: 01 Nov 1999
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    Handle: RePEc:fth:nystfi:99-070

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    Postal: U.S.A.; New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics . 44 West 4th Street. New York, New York 10012-1126
    Phone: (212) 998-0100
    Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/
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    1. Julian R. Franks & Kjell G. Nyborg & Walter N. Torous, 1996. "A Comparison of UK, US and German Insolvency Codes," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 25(3), Fall.
    2. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
    3. Gilson, Stuart C. & John, Kose & Lang, Larry H. P., 1990. "Troubled debt restructurings*1: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 315-353, October.
    4. Hayne E. Leland., 1998. "Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-278, University of California at Berkeley.
    5. Chemmanur, Thomas J & Fulghieri, Paolo, 1994. " Investment Bank Reputation, Information Production, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 57-79, March.
    6. Zsuzsanna Fluck & Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Harvey S. Rosen, 1998. "Where Does the Money Come From? The Financing of Small Entrepreneurial Enterprises," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 98-038, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    7. Stewart C. Myers, 1998. "Outside Equity Financing," NBER Working Papers 6561, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Warner, Jerold B., 1979. "On financial contracting : An analysis of bond covenants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-161, June.
    9. Kose John, 1993. "Managing Financial Distress and Valuing Distressed Securities: A Survey and a Research Agenda," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 22(3), Fall.
    10. Gavish, Bezalel & Kalay, Avner, 1983. "On the Asset Substitution Problem," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 21-30, March.
    11. Franks, Julian R. & Torous, Walter N., 1994. "A comparison of financial recontracting in distressed exchanges and chapter 11 reorganizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 349-370, June.
    12. Boot, Arnoud W A & Greenbaum, Stuart I & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1165-83, December.
    13. Chemmanur, Thomas J & Fulghieri, Paolo, 1994. "Reputation, Renegotiation, and the Choice between Bank Loans and Publicly Traded Debt," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(3), pages 475-506.
    14. Sweeney, Amy Patricia, 1994. "Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting responses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 281-308, May.
    15. James, Christopher, 1995. "When Do Banks Take Equity in Debt Restructurings?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(4), pages 1209-34.
    16. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
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