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Debt, Investment, and Product Market Competition

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Author Info
Matthew J. Clayton
Abstract

Recent empirical literature on the interaction between capital structure, investment, and product market decisions suggests that debt leads to lower investment expenditures and weaker product market competition. Theoretical literature in this area has been unable to fully explain this finding (perhaps because all theoretical papers look only at two of the above decisions). This paper develops a model which examines all three decisions and shows that debt and investment can be substitutes in a model where firms rationally take on debt. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that when firms compete with prices in the product market, an increase in debt leads to lower investment and higher prices.

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Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business- in its series New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires with number 99-056.

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Date of creation: Jan 1999
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Handle: RePEc:fth:nystfi:99-056

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Postal: U.S.A.; New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics . 44 West 4th Street. New York, New York 10012-1126
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Rotemberg, Julio J & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "Shareholder-Value Maximization and Product-Market Competition," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 367-91. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Chevalier, Judith A, 1995. "Capital Structure and Product-Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermarket Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 415-35, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hart, Oliver D & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 509-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Kaplan, Steven, 1989. "The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 217-254. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Showalter, Dean M, 1995. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 647-53, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Dan Kovenock & Gordon M Phillips, 1995. "Capital Structure and Product Market Behavior: An Examination of Plant Exit and Investment Decisions," Working Papers 95-4, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Vojislav Maksimovic, 1988. "Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 389-407, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1983. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 225-235, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1991. "Financial Contracts as Lasting Commitments: The Case of Leveraged Oligopoly," Papers 92-01, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  15. Phillips, Gordon M., 1995. "Increased debt and industry product markets An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 189-238, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Matthew J. Clayton & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999. "The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-055, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]
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