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Anti-Dumping Jumping: Reciprocal Anti-Dumping and Indutrial Location

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  • Haaland, J.I.
  • Wooton, I.

Abstract

Anti-dumping policies are often justified as legitimate actions by governments in their efforts to protect domestic producers from unfair foreign competition. We investigate the impact of anti-dumping rules on firms' production decisions as to how much and where to produce. Anti-dumping measures may have unforeseen effects if they induce direct foreign investment and consequently increase domestic competition. We therefore focus on location choice and consider the strategies of national governments attempting to advance the interests of their citizens through anti-dumping legislation. Our analysis also has implications for the effects of market integration policies, such as Europe 1992.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Haaland, J.I. & Wooton, I., 1995. "Anti-Dumping Jumping: Reciprocal Anti-Dumping and Indutrial Location," Papers 22/95, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:norgee:22/95
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruce A. Blonigen & KaSaundra Tomlin & Wesley W. Wilson, 2019. "Tariff-Jumping FDI and Domestic Firms’ Profits," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Foreign Direct Investment, chapter 14, pages 473-500, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Matthew T Cole & Ronald B Davies, 2009. "Optimal Tariffs, Tariff Jumping, and Heterogeneous Firms," Working Papers 200919, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    3. Sourafel Girma & David Greenaway & Katherine Wakelin, 2002. "Does antidumping stimulate FDI? Evidence from Japanese firms in the UK," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 138(3), pages 414-436, September.
    4. Christian Gormsen, 2011. "Anti-dumping with heterogeneous firms," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 125, pages 41-64.
    5. Haufler, Andreas & Wooton, Ian, 1999. "Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 121-139, January.
    6. Cole, Matthew T. & Davies, Ronald B., 2011. "Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 480-496, May.
    7. Bruce A. Blonigen, 2019. "Tariff-Jumping Antidumping Duties," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Foreign Direct Investment, chapter 5, pages 179-203, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Yasukazu Ichino, 2013. "Antidumping Petition, Foreign Direct Investment, and Strategic Exports," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 4(1), pages 22-34, March.
    9. Gaurav Bhattacharya, 2019. "Location decisions of industries in the presence of transportation costs and environmental regulations: empirical evidence from India," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 21(1), pages 24-53, June.
    10. Ian Wooton & Maurizio Zanardi, 2002. "Trade and Competition Policy: Anti-Dumping versus Anti-trust," Working Papers 2002_6, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Oct 2002.
    11. Belderbos, Rene & Vandenbussche, Hylke & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1999. "Undertakings and Antidumping Jumping FDI in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 2320, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. René Belderbos, 2003. "Antidumping and foreign divestment: Japanese electronics multinationals in the EU," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 139(1), pages 131-160, March.
    13. Falvey, Rod & Wittayarungruangsri, Sarut, 2006. "Market size and antidumping in duopolistic competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 771-786, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; DUMPING;

    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • R3 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location
    • R30 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - General

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