Collude, Compete, or Both? Deregulation in the Norwegian Airline Industry
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to test the nature of competition concerning price and capacity setting in the Norwegian airline industry after the deregulation in 1994. Did the two airlines, SAS and Braathens, compete on prices and capacities (competition), collude on prices and capacities (collusion) or collude on prices and compete on capacities (semicollusion)? We reject the hypothesis that they achieved collusion, and we find the observed behaviour consistent with semicollusive behaviour and inconsistent with competitive behaviour.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- in its series Papers with number 18/98.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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Postal: NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HELLEVEIEN 30, 5035 BERGEN SANDVIKEN NORWAY.
Phone: 5595 9000
Fax: 5595 9100
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/
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DEREGULATION ; MARKET STRUCTURE ; ECONOMETRICS ; COMPETITION;
Other versions of this item:
- Kjell G. Salvanes & Frode Steen & Lars Sørgard, 2003. "Collude, Compete, or Both? Deregulation in the Norwegian Airline Industry," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 37(3), pages 383-416, September.
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
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- Jan K. Brueckner & Pierre M. Picard, 2011.
"Airline Alliances, Carve-Outs and Collusion,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3593, CESifo Group Munich.
- Stenborg, Markku, 2002. "Economics of Joint Dominance," Discussion Papers 834, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Clark, Derek J. & Jørgensen, Finn & Mathisen, Terje Andreas, 2011. "Relationships between fares, trip length and market competition," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 45(7), pages 611-624, August.
- Markku Stenborg, 2004. "Forest for the Trees: Economics of Joint Dominance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 365-385, December.
- Nakagawa, Dai & Aoyama, Yoshitaka & Ito, Tadashi & Nishizawa, Hiroyuki, 2005. "Assessment of passenger benefits brought about by international airport projects," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 512-524, November.
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