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Discount Chains and Brand Policy

Author

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  • Staahl Gabrielsen, T.
  • Sorgard, L.

Abstract

Retail chains are observed in many industries. The question addressed here is whether retail chains can exploit buyer power by excluding some brands. In a theoretical model with two differentiated producers and a single retailer, we show that a retailer will require exclusivity (exclude a brand) if the brands are sufficiently symmetric in demand potential.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Staahl Gabrielsen, T. & Sorgard, L., 1994. "Discount Chains and Brand Policy," Papers 13-94, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:norgee:13-94
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    Cited by:

    1. Yuxin Chen & Xinxin Li, 2013. "Group Buying Commitment and Sellers’ Competitive Advantages," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 164-183, March.
    2. Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl & Sorgard, Lars, 2007. "Private labels, price rivalry, and public policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 403-424, February.
    3. Ramon Fauli-Oller & Borja Mesa-Sánchez, 2015. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: an Extension to a Successive Oligopoly Model with Product Differentiation," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(5), pages 604-621, September.
    4. Rafael Moner‐Colonques & José J. Sempere‐Monerris & Amparo Urbano, 2011. "Product Line Choice in Retail Duopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 777-802, September.
    5. David E. Mills, 2017. "Buyer‐Induced Exclusive Dealing," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(1), pages 66-81, July.
    6. Cong Pan, 2016. "Retailer’s product line choice with manufacturer’s multichannel marketing," ISER Discussion Paper 0976, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    7. Ramon Fauli‐Oller & Joel Sandonís, 2021. "Buyer power, product assortment and asymmetric retail formats," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 196-211, April.
    8. Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl, 2005. "Slotting Allowances and Buy-Back Clauses," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24580, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    retail trade ; contracts;

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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