Joint Ventures and Transfer Pricing Rivalry
AbstractThe paper studies the performance of joint ventures where upstreams firms sell inputs to a production joint venture. It is found that joint ventures lead to overinvoicing of input prices (tranfer prices) compared to integrated firms resulting in lower aggregate profits. Tax and tariff policy may improve the organizational inefficiencies of joint ventures. The analysis suggests that firms must have other reasons for forming joint ventures than those guided by production efficiency and benefits from delegation of decision-making.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- in its series Papers with number 10/98.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HELLEVEIEN 30, 5035 BERGEN SANDVIKEN NORWAY.
Phone: 5595 9000
Fax: 5595 9100
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/
More information through EDIRC
PRICING ; JOINT VENTURES;
Other versions of this item:
- Gabrielsen, T.S. & Schjelderup, G., 1998. "Joint Ventures and Transfer Pricing Rivalry," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0898, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
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