Technical Efficiency Under Alternative Regulatory Regimes: Evidence from the Inter-War Britich Gas Industry
AbstractFrom 1920 until nationalisation, privately owned gas companies in Britain were regulated under one of three systems: the Maximum Price, the Sliding Scale, or the Basic Price system. In effect, the industry was the subject of a remarkable experiment in regulation. Hitherto, there has been no empirical analysis of the incentive properties of the regimes applied. This paper attempts such an investigation by using Data Envelopment Analysis to estimate the relative efficiency of a sample of undertakings under each system. Undertakings operating under the basic price system are found to be more efficient which suggests that incentive regulation was effective in the industry at this time.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Nantes - Economie Internationale et de l'Entreprise in its series Papers with number 280.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: Universite de Nantes, Centre d'Etudes sur l'Economie Internationale et l'Entreprise. 110, Bd. Michelet 44071 Nantes CEDEX 03 France.
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NATURAL GAS ; REGULATION ; PRICING;
Other versions of this item:
- Hammond, Christopher J & Johnes, Geraint & Robinson, Terry, 2002. "Technical Efficiency under Alternative Regulatory Regimes: Evidence from the Inter-war British Gas Industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 251-70, November.
- L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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- Jamasb, Tooraj & Pollitt, Michael, 2007.
"Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: Lessons of experience from Britain,"
Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 6163-6187, December.
- Jamasb, T. & Pollitt, M., 2007. "Incentive Regulation of Electricity Distribution Networks: Lessons of Experience from Britain," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0709, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Tooraj Jamasb & Magnus Söderberg, 2010. "The Effects of Average Norm Model Regulation: The Case of Electricity Distribution in Sweden," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 249-269, May.
- Jamasb, T. & Söderberg, M., 2009. "Yardstick and Ex-post Regulation by Norm Model: Empirical Equivalence, Pricing Effect, and Performance in Sweeden," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0908, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Uri, Noel D., 2003. "The adoption of incentive regulation and its effect on technical efficiency in telecommunications in the United States," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 21-34, October.
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