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Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria

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Author Info

  • McLennan, A
  • Park, I-U

Abstract

The maximal generic number of Nash equilibria for two person games in which the two agents each have four pure strategies is shown to be 15. In contrast to Keiding (1995), who arrives at this result by computer enumeration, our argument is based on a collection of lemmas that constrain the set of equilibria. Several of these pertain to any common number d of pure strategies for the two agents.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Minnesota - Center for Economic Research in its series Papers with number 300.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:minner:300

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA 35455 U.S.A.
Phone: (612)625-6353
Fax: (612)624-0209
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Web page: http://www.econ.umn.edu/
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Keywords: ECONOMETRICS;

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Cited by:
  1. McLennan, Andrew & Berg, Johannes, 2005. "Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 264-295, May.
  2. Ravi Kannan & Thorsten Theobald, 2010. "Games of fixed rank: a hierarchy of bimatrix games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 157-173, January.
  3. Philip V. Fellman & Jonathan Vos Post, 2007. "Quantum Nash Equilibria and Quantum Computing," Papers 0707.0324, arXiv.org.

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