Partial Shirking within Efficiency Wage Theory: The Possibility of Long_Run Racial Discrimination
AbstractThe 'Shirking model' of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) allows the possibility of partial shirking, where effort varies between zero and one because of asymmetric information favouring workers. This paper argues that within this framework it is possible to introduce a racist element into workers' utility functions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Middlesex University - School of Economics in its series Papers with number 70.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
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Postal: U.K.; School of Economics, Middlesex University Business School, the Burroughs, London NW4 4BT
Phone: 44(020) 8362 5981
Fax: 44(020) 8362 5981
Web page: http://www.mdx.ac.uk/www/economics/
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WAGES ; DISCRIMINATION;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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