Non-Cooperative Wage Bargaining
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by London School of Economics - Centre for Labour Economics in its series Papers with number 349.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, CENTER FOR LABOUR ECONOMICS, HOUGHTON STREET LONDON WC2A 2AE ENGLAND.
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.lse.ac.uk/
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cooperatives ; collective bargaining ; wages ; information;
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- Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989.
"Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents,"
NBER Working Papers
3108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March.
- Paola Manzini, 1996.
"Strategic bargaining with destructive power,"
Game Theory and Information
- David Nickerson & Asha Sadanand & Venkatraman Sadanand, 1994. "Strategic delay and endogenous offers in bargaining games with private information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 125-154, June.
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