Using the spatial theory of voting, this paper describes an institutional structure where there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule, and the legislative elected by proportional rule. The resulting policy outcome is described through a compromise between these two branches.
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Paper provided by Universite catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics (CORE) in its series Papers with number
9965.
Length: 13 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:louvco:9965
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General