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On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets

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Author Info
Amir, R.
Lambson, V.E.

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Abstract

In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that, as the number of firms increases, the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to (i) decreasing industry price and increasing or decreasing per-firm output; and (ii) increasing industry price (and decreasing per-firm output).

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics in its series Papers with number 9959.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:louvco:9959

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Related research
Keywords: GAME THEORY OLIGOPOLIES MARKET STRUCTURE

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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This page was last updated on 2008-10-3.


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