Dictatorial Domains

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Dictatorial Domains

Author Info

Aswal, N.
Chatterji, S.
Sen, A,

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics in its series Papers with number 9940.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:louvco:9940

Contact details of provider:
Postal: BELGIQUE, UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, CENTER FOR OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND ECONOMETRICS (CORE), LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE, BELGIQUE.
Phone: 32(10)474321
Fax: 32(10)474301
Email:
Web page: http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: SOCIAL CHOICE

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Dictatorial domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 45-62, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA," Working Papers 38, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2006. "Top-Pair and Top-Triple Monotonicity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 175-187, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Pär Torstensson, 2008. "Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 181-196, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lauren N. Merrill, 2007. "A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Rules over the Condorcet Domain with an Even Number of Individuals," Working Papers 60, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
Selçuk Özyurt & M. Sanver, 2008. "Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 89-101, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ugur Ozdemir & M. Sanver, 2007. "Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 61-76, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? All bibliographic data on IDEAS has been put in the public domain by the publishers.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.