We study the efficiency of the equilibrium price in a centralized, order-driven market where many asymmetrically informed traders are active for many periods.
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Paper provided by Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics in its series Papers with number
9935.
Length: 33 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:louvco:9935
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
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