A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group with the highest sum of the agents' bids, only if this sum exceeds a minimum price declared previously by the auctioneer.
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Paper provided by Universite catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics (CORE) in its series Papers with number
9777.
Length: 32 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:louvco:9777
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods