The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomlete information game.
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Paper provided by Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics in its series Papers with number
9649.
Length: 17 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:louvco:9649
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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