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Optimal Penal Codes in Stochastic Bertrand Games and Collusion Over the Business Cycle

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Author Info
Lambson, V.E.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universite catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics (CORE) in its series Papers with number 9519.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:louvco:9519

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Postal: BELGIQUE, UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, CENTER FOR OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND ECONOMETRICS (CORE), LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE, BELGIQUE.
Phone: 32(10)474321
Fax: 32(10)474301
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Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/en-core.html
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Related research
Keywords: BUSINESS CYCLES

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