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Social Insurance Competition Between Bismarck and Beveridge

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Author Info
Cremer, H.
Pestieau, P.

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Abstract

The European Union consists of a wide variety of welfare states with social insurance schemes ranging from those providing earnings related benefits (Bismarckian)to flat rate benefits (Beveridgean)systems. The conventional wisdom is that with factor mobility poor people have incentives to move towards Beveridgean countries and rich individuals to move out of them. Consequently, Beveridgean regimes would not be sustainable; they would have to adapt or to perish. This paper studies the validity of such a conjecture within a simple model.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universite catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics (CORE) in its series Papers with number 2001/31.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:louvco:2001/31

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Related research
Keywords: INSURANCE INCOME COMPETITION

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 341-364, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-74, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Laszlo Goerke, 2000. "Bismarck versus Beveridge. Flat-Rate and Earnings-Related Unemployment Insurance in a General Efficiency Wage Framework," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(3), pages 243-, May.
  4. CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2002. "Factor Mobility and Redistribution: A Survey," IDEI Working Papers 154, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
  5. Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 1998. "The political economy of targeting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 177-200, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Georges Casamatta & Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2001. "Demographic Shock and Social Security: A Political Economy Perspective," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 417-431, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Andreas Bergh, 2004. "On the Redistributive Effect of Upper Benefit Limits in Bismarckian Social Insurance," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Society for Economic Research, vol. 17(2), pages 73-78, Autumn. [Downloadable!]
  2. Panu Poutvaara, 2005. "Social Security Incentives, Human Capital Investment and Mobility of Labor," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Tim Krieger & Stefan Traub, 2008. "Back to Bismarck? Shifting Preferences for Intragenerational Redistribution in OECD Pension Systems," Working Papers 13, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stéphane Rossignol & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2006. "Asymmetric social protection systems with migration," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 481-505, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Michael Gorski & Tim Krieger & Thomas Lange, 2007. "Pensions, Education and Life Expectancy," Working Papers 4, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-15.

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