In this paper we examine compensation schemes that prevent a threat of secession by all country's regions and in the same time provide no incentives for citizens' migration within the country. We prove that, under quite general assumptions on the distribution of citizens' preferences, there exist transfer schemes that are both secession-proof and migration-proof.
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Paper provided by Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics in its series Papers with number
0111.
Length: 33 pages Date of creation: 2001 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:louvco:0111
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
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