A component of Nash equilibria is potentially stable if there exists an evolutionary selection dynamics from a broad class for which the component is asymptotically stable. Anecessary condition for potential stability is that the component's index agrees with its Euler characteristic. Second, if the latter is nonzero, the component contains a strategically stable set.
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Paper provided by Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics in its series Papers with number
0059.
Length: 33 pages Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:louvco:0059
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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