This paper analyzes a competition game between two universities that teach and research in the same juridiction. The resulting equilibrium is unique and symmetric but differs according to preferences, technologies and public policy. The bydget for university finance is exogenously givenand consists of lump-sum amount and a per-student allocation. Under this finance structure, we are able to identify four types of equilibria characterized, respectively, by full-time teaching, full-time research, selective teaching plus research and mass teaching plus research.
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Paper provided by Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics in its series Papers with number
0030.
Length: 33 pages Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:louvco:0030
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
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