Agents with Imperfect Empathy May Survive Natural Selection
AbstractCultural transmission mechanisms which favor the direct transmission of the parents traits to their children may be adaptative to natural selection when opposed to mechanisms in which the parents choose for the offspring the highest fitness at any time. This is so, in particular, in environments in which the determinants of the reproductive success of a cultural trait are highly variable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie in its series Papers with number 1999-11.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Chaire d'economie et d'econometrie de l'assurance; DELTA; CREST; PARIS, France.
CULTURE ; SOCIETY ; NATURAL SELECTION;
Other versions of this item:
- Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 2001. "Agents with imperfect empathy may survive natural selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 277-285, May.
- Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1999. "Agents with Imperfect Empathy. May Survive Natural Selection," DELTA Working Papers 1999-11, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
- Z00 - Other Special Topics - - General - - - General
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