The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth
AbstractThis paper proposes an analysis of the links between the internal organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face agency costs. These agency costs are due to the existence of asymmetries of information and the formation of internal vertical collusions. As a response to the opportunity of internal collusion optimal incentive contracts depend on the efficiency of collusive side contracting within organizations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie in its series Papers with number 1999-08.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Chaire d'economie et d'econometrie de l'assurance; DELTA; CREST; PARIS, France.
ECONOMIC GROWTH ; COSTS ; BUSINESS ORGANIZATION ; CONTRACTS;
Other versions of this item:
- Martimort, David & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. " The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 315-40, December.
- Martimort, D. & Verdier, T., 1999. "The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth," DELTA Working Papers 1999-08, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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- Ottaviano, Gianmarco Ireo Paolo, 2007. "Contract Enforcement, Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 6419, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- David Martimort & Thierry Verdier, 2004.
"The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1119-1141.
- David Martimort & Thierry Verdier, 2004. "The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(4), pages 1119-1141, October.
- Martimort, David & Verdier, Thierry, 2003. "The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth," IDEI Working Papers 170, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Martimort, David & Verdier, Thierry, 2004. "The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Francois, P. & Lloyd-Ellis, H., 2003. "Co-movement, Capital and Contracts: 'Normal' Cycles Through Creative Destruction," Discussion Paper 2003-62, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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