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The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth

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Author Info
Martimort, D.
Verdier, T.

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Abstract

This paper proposes an analysis of the links between the internal organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face agency costs. These agency costs are due to the existence of asymmetries of information and the formation of internal vertical collusions. As a response to the opportunity of internal collusion optimal incentive contracts depend on the efficiency of collusive side contracting within organizations.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie in its series Papers with number 1999-08.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:lavale:1999-08

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Chaire d'economie et d'econometrie de l'assurance; DELTA; CREST; PARIS, France.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: ECONOMIC GROWTH ; COSTS ; BUSINESS ORGANIZATION ; CONTRACTS;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

Cited by:
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  1. Ottaviano, Gianmarco Ireo Paolo, 2007. "Contract Enforcement, Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 6419, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Martimort, David & Verdier, Thierry, 2003. "The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth," IDEI Working Papers 170, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2003. "Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  4. Francois, P. & Lloyd-Ellis, H., 2003. "Co-movement, capital and contracts: 'normal' cycles through creative destruction," Discussion Paper 62, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.

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