Impact of Regulatory Agencies on the Efficiency of Publicly-Owned Utilities
AbstractWe compare the economic efficiency of a publicly-owned utility directly controlled by the government with a publicly-owned utility regulated by a public utility commission (PUC). Regulation by a PUC is modelled as a Nash equilibrium of a game between two principals, the government and the PUC, each of them having control over a subset of decision variables determining the utility performance. A utility manager, who has private information over a productivity parameter, is the agent. Comparisons of both regulatory regimes are made with respect to output, choice of inputs, manager's information rent and firm's profit. Reasons for which the government should prefer one regulatory regime over the other are discussed. The recent regulatory reform of electricity markets in the province of Quebec (Canada) provides an illustration of the model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laval - Recherche en Energie in its series Papers with number 99-09.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
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Postal: UNIVERSITE LAVAL, GREEN, DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIQUE, QUEBEC G1K 7P4.
Phone: (418) 656-2096
Fax: (418) 656-7412
Web page: http://www.green.ecn.ulaval.ca/
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REGULATION ; PUBLIC ENTERPRISES;
Other versions of this item:
- Bernard, Jean-Thomas & Nouhi, Mohamed & Roland, Michel, 1999. "Impact of Regulatory Agencies on the Efficiency of Publicly-Owned Utilities," Cahiers de recherche 9915, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
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