This paper uses an optimal contract approach to examine the issue of compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy when the farmer is risk neutral and risk averse. The environmental agency chooses monitoring accuracy and payments for farmer's (non-)compliance. With a risk-neutral farmer, an optimal policy involves maximum allowable reward for compliance and maximum allowable penalty for non-compliance.
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Paper provided by La Trobe - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
97.08.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy