We examine the effect of bilateral trade in a concentrated industry under Cournot competition, when firms are regulated by national agencies who care about national social welfare. We allow for differences in costs and market sizes, and for asymmetric information between regulatory agencies and regulated firms.
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Paper provided by Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques- in its series Papers with number
9631.
Length: 37 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:inseep:9631
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
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