This paper characterizes interim efficient allocation rules in a Bayesian environment with independent private values for a discrete public good.
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Paper provided by Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques- in its series Papers with number
9629.
Length: 27 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:inseep:9629
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006.
"Conflict and the Social Contract,"
Discussion Papers
94, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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