Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Bruno Jullien
• Bernard J.-M. Caillaud

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Paper provided by Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques- in its series Papers with number 9122.

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Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:inseep:9122

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Related research

Keywords: management risk economic models

Other versions of this item:

• Paper
  • Caillaud Bernard & Jullien Bruno, 1991. "Managerial incentives based on insider information," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9128, CEPREMAP.

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This page was last updated on 2008-8-25.