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Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard

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Author Info
Jullien, B.
Salanie, B.
Salanie, F.

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Abstract

Principal-agent models of moral hazard have been developed under the assumption that the principal knows the agent's risk-aversion. This paper extends the moral hazard model to the case when the agent's risk-aversion is his private information.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques- in its series Papers with number 2000-41.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:inseep:2000-41

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Related research
Keywords: ECONOMIC MODELS RISK INFORMATION INSURANCE

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Guiso, Luigi & Jappelli, Tullio & Terlizzese, Daniele, 1996. "Income Risk, Borrowing Constraints, and Portfolio Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 158-72, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Landsberger Michael & Meilijson Isaac, 1994. "Monopoly Insurance under Adverse Selection When Agents Differ in Risk Aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 392-407, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Hemenway, David, 1990. "Propitious Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 1063-69, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Faynzilberg, Peter S. & Kumar, Praveen, 1997. "Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 15-39, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  9. Hemenway, David, 1992. " Propitious Selection in Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-51, July.
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. John M. Abowd, 1990. "Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate performance?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 43(3), pages 52-73, February.
  12. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 407-30, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1987. "Competition for Agency Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 296-307, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 149-173, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Christian Grund & Dirk Sliwka, 2006. "Performance Pay and Risk Aversion," Discussion Papers 101, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Philippe, DE DONDER & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2006. "Does Propitious Selection Explain why Riskier People Buy less Insurance," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006017, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Stefania Albanesi & Claudia Olivetti, 2006. "Home Production, Market Production and the Gender Wage Gap: Incentives and Expectations," NBER Working Papers 12212, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," NBER Working Papers 12289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2006. "Testing for Adverse Selection with "Unused Observables"," NBER Working Papers 12112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Lucien Gardiol & Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Chantal Grandchamp, 2003. "Separating Selection and Incentive Effects: an Econometric Study of Swiss Health Insurance Claims Data," DELTA Working Papers 2003-27, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  7. Chiappori, Pierre Andre & Salanie, Bernard, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  8. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2003. "Private Information and its Effect on Market Equilibrium: New Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance," NBER Working Papers 9957, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
  10. Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, 2005. "Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice," NBER Working Papers 11461, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2006. "Competitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Labor Supply," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 614, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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