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Unfair Competition by Government Firms and Authorities in the Consulting Market

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Author Info
Svensson, R.

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Abstract

Government firms and authorities often sell services in the free market via affiliated consulting firms (CFs). In this study, I analyze whether these agents have an unfair competitive edge compared to private CFs. The theoretical analysis shows that private and state-owned CFs operate under different conditions. A private CF must choose between having permanent employees and pay full-time wages with the risk of over- and under-capacity or hiring professionals temporarily in the free market, which gives flexibility but may cause problems in hiring qualified professionals.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) in its series Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers with number 561.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:iniesr:561

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Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ; B.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
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Related research
Keywords: COMPETITION ; CONTRACTS ; GOVERNMENT ; WAGES;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
L8 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Ordover, Janusz A. & Saloner, Garth, 1989. "Predation, monopolization, and antitrust," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 537-596 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Roger Svensson, 2001. "Success Determinants when Tendering for International Consulting Projects," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 101-122, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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