Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance

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Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance

Author Info

Lindbeck, A.
Nyberg, S.

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Abstract

Children who can count on support from altruistic parents may not try hard to succeed in the labor market. Moreover, parental altruism makes withdrawal of such support non-credible. To promote work effort, parents may want to instill norms which later cause their children to experience guilt or shame associated with failure to support themselves. While social insurance pools risk across families, we show that it also creates a free-rider problem among parents in terms of norm formation.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) in its series Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers with number 557.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:iniesr:557

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Related research
Keywords: CHILDREN ; PARENTS ; LABOUR MARKET;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2006. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms, and Social Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1473-1503, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten, 2001. "Raising Children To Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms And Social Insurance," Seminar Papers 691, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten, 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," Research Papers in Economics 2001:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten, 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," Working Paper Series 557, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology
D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other
D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism
H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

References listed on IDEAS
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Other versions:
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repec:att:wimass:199323 is not listed on IDEAS
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Other versions:
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