This paper proposes an approach for prediction the pattern of mergers when different mergers are feasible. It generalizes the traditional IO approach, employing ideas on coalition-formation from cooperative gave theory. The model suggests that in concentrated markets, mergers are conductive to market structures with large industry profits, and thus points to a conflict between private and social incentives. It is shown how mergers may be undertaken in order to preempt other possible, and socially more desirable, mergers. The model also throws light on the formation of research joint ventures and tariff-jumping foreign direct investment.
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Length: 43 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:iniesr:513
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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