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Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model

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Author Info
Saez-Marti, M.
Weibull, J.W.

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Abstract

In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational indivudals are recurrently matched to play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply tthe myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (1993b) bargaining model.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) in its series Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers with number 507.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:iniesr:507

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Related research
Keywords: GAME THEORY ; ECONOMIC MODELS;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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  3. Tore Ellingsen & Jack Robles, 2000. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-up Problem," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1525, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game," Working Papers 309, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]
  5. Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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