This paper analyzes the interplay between social norms and economic incentives in the context of work decision in the modern welfare state. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger the population fraction adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual.
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Length: 27 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:iniesr:476
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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