Each solution concept on a class of normal form games with a given outcome space can be regarded as a social choice correspondence. Here we present a general method of constructing compound solution concepts out of given ones by means of games of pretension.
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Length: 2 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:inecpu:162
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations