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Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining

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  • Krishna, V.
  • Serrano, R.

Abstract

We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the "n"-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," [rho]. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (1) small values of [rho]; and (2) large values of [rho]. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of [rho] is provided.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard - Institute of Economic Research in its series Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers with number 10.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:10

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Keywords: bargaining;

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Cited by:
  1. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
  2. Nicolás Porteiro, 2007. "An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 19-40, January.
  3. Joosung Lee, 2013. "Bargaining and Buyout," 2013 Papers, Job Market Papers ple701, Job Market Papers.
  4. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
  5. Ju, Yuan, 2012. "Reject and renegotiate: The Shapley value in multilateral bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 431-436.
  6. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
  7. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core And Shapley Value," Working Papers, CEMFI wp2007_0709, CEMFI.
  8. Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2000. "Bargaining with asymmetric threat points," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 333-339, December.

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