Strike Ballots in a Model with Private Information
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Hamburg, Institute of Economics in its series Faechergruppe Volkswirtschaftlehre with number 81.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Institute of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, D-20146 Hamburg F.R.G
Phone: +49 (0)40 6541 2590
Fax: +49 (0)40 6541 2780
Web page: http://www.hsu-hh.de/fgvwl/
More information through EDIRC
STRIKES; BARGAINING; INFORMATION;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
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