Auctions and the Dynamics of Corruption
AbstractOrganizations require discretionary decision making to be delegated and to be under only partial scrutiny from supervisors. This introduces the possibility for agents to use their discretionary power to their own advantage and in detriment to the organization. We model this situation by considering an agent who is supposed to employ a prespecified value function in order to evaluate offers in a procurement process in which the quality of the product or service being offered matters as well as its price.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 97.459.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
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Postal: GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse I Place Anatole France 31042 - Toulouse CEDEX France.
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Web page: http://www-gremaq.univ-tlse1.fr/
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AUCTIONS ; CORRUPTION;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Value Theory
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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