How Many Karats Is Gold: Welfare Effects of Easing a Denomination Standard
AbstractMost consumers benefit from a lowering of the required amount of aurous metal which jewelers must include in products sold as "gold." However, profits of producers of gold-plated adornments fall. The net welfare effect depends on whether the principal difference between consumers is their appreciation of the gold content, or their valuation of designation gold or gold-plated. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 92.271.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 1992
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consumption ; regulation;
Other versions of this item:
- Crampes, Claude & Hollander, Abraham, 1995. "How Many Karats Is Gold: Welfare Effects of Easing a Denomination Standard," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 131-43, March.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1992. "How Many Karats Is Gold: Welfare Effects of Easing a Denomination Standard," Cahiers de recherche 9225, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1992. "How Many Karats Is Gold: Welfare Effects of Easing a Denomination Standard," Cahiers de recherche 9225, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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