This paper tries to reconcile incentive theory with transaction costs theory. we first discuss the fundamental assumptions underlying the use of the Revelation Principle in the standard mecanisme design literature and show how various contractual incompletenesses and externalities induced by transaction costs affect the basic trade-off between allocative efficiency and informational rents highlighted by this literature. We then propose reduced form formula to precisely describe the impact of these transaction costs in various contexts.
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Paper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number
00-539.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights