Ligation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Case
AbstractWe investigate how intensive should be the monitoring effort and how the reaction of the patentholder may influence the entry decision. In a simultaneous game we show that even if the penalty paid by the infringer and the settlement cost are high, the patentholder may decide to choose a settlement instead of a trial. Furthermore, the likelihood of entry increases with the penalty for certain values of the parmeters. If monitoring expenditures and centry are sequential, whatever the decision order entry occurs less often than in the simultaneous setting.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 00-537.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse I Place Anatole France 31042 - Toulouse CEDEX France.
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MARKET ; DECISION MAKING ; GAMES;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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- Färnstrand Damsgaard, Erika & Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2012. "Why Entrepreneurs Choose Risky R&D Projects - But Still Not Risky Enough," Working Paper Series 926, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Katharine Rockett, 2009. "Property Rights and Invention," Economics Discussion Papers 663, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
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