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Lobbying and the Structure of Protection

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Author Info
Cadot, O
de Mela, J
Olarreaga, M

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Abstract

This paper extends the influence-driven model of trade policy determination to include general equilibrium effets on the supply side resulting from labour-market interaction and intermediate goods. The model's predictions for the structure of protection are related to underlying taste and technology parameters, and we derive analytically several propositions that are consistent with the stylized results of the empirical literature.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Geneva, Department of Political Economy in its series University of Geneva Economics Working Papers with number 96.14.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:geneec:96.14

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Related research
Keywords: COMMERCIAL POLICY

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

Cited by:
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  1. Madani, Dorsati & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2002. "Politically optimal tariffs : an application to Egypt," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2882, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  2. Houda Haffoudhi, 2005. "Political-support lobbies responses to international environmental agreements," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j05053, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
  3. Giorgia Albertin, 2008. "Regionalism or Multilateralism? A Political Economy Choice," IMF Working Papers 08/65, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  4. Cadot, Olivier & de Melo, Jaime & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2000. "The Protectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks and the New Regionalism," CEPR Discussion Papers 2559, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. de Melo, Jaime & Grether, Jean-Marie & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 1999. "Who Determines Mexican Trade Policy?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2176, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Cadot, Olivier & de Melo, Jaime & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2001. "Can duty-drawbacks have a protectionist bias?Evidence from MERCOSUR," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2523, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  7. Conconi, P., 2000. "Green and Producer Lobbies: Enemies or Allies?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 570, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Houda Haffoudhi, 2005. "The logic of two-level games with endogenous lobbying : the case of international environmental agreements," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j05054, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
  9. Belfrage, Carl-Johan, 2004. "Special Interest Politics and Trade Policy – An Empirical Challenge," Working Papers 2005:31, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-2.

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