An axiomatization of the interactions between the palyers of any coalition is given. It is based on three axioms: linearity, dummy and symmetry. These interaction indices extend the Banzhaf and Shapley values when using in addition two equivalent recursive axioms. Lastly, the authors give an expression of the Banzhaf and Shapely interaction indices in terms of pseudo-Boolean functions.
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Length: 23 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:gemame:9818
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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